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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL ESTATE TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT OF 1951
By
JOHN

E. WILLIAMS*

FOREWORD

Introduced as H.R. 2084, this act was signed by the President on June 28,
19511 and becan-e effective, by its terms, for estates of decedents dying after October 21, 1942. It completely revised Section 811 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code,
retroactively taking effect as if its provisions had originally been contained in the
Revenue Act of 1942.
The act was intended to simplify the powers of appointment section 2and to
provide "a test of taxability which is simple, dear-cut, and easy to apply".
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, tentative
regulations were published in the Federal Register on August 5, 1953, for consideration of data, views or arguments before the regulations became final.
The writer, under date of August 28, 1953, submitted to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue certain objections and views. The final regulations on the
Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 were approved July 7, 1954, and were published in the FederalRegister July 14, 1954.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, approved August 16, 1954, made no
change in the federal estate tax law as to powers of appointment. Treasury Decision
6091, issued the same day, made all prior regulations under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 applicable to the corresponding provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 in so far as the regulations would not be inconsistent. Inthe case
of the federal estate tax regulations as to powers of appointment, there could be no
inconsistency because the 1954 Code did not change the provisions of the law.
The purpose of this article is to furnish a synopsis of the final regulations,
with particular attention to the changes from the tentative regulations of August,
1953.
REGULATIONS 105, SECTION 81.24

Paragraph (a) (1) is entitled "Introduction" and states that the value of
property in respect to which the decedent possessed, exercised or released certain
powers of appointment may be includible in the gross estate.
Assistant Vice President, Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia; A. B., Princeton University;
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Paragraph (a) (2) defines the term "power of appointment" to include all
powers which are in substance or effect powers of appointment, regardless of the
nomenclature used in creating the power and regardless of local property law
connotations. Examples of such powers are given as follows:
(1) A beneficiary's right to appropriate or consume principal.
(2) A donee's power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate a trust.
(3) A wife's power of testamentary disposition, under community property laws, over property in which she does not have a vested interest.
(4) An unrestricted power in an individual to remove or discharge a
trustee and appoint himself, if he then, as trustee, can appoint principal for the benefit of individuals, including himself. 3
Examples of powers that are not considered as powers of appointment, if
exercisable in a fiduciary capacity and/or the holder has no right to enlarge or
shift beneficial interests, are:
(1) The mere power of management, investment and custody of assets.
(2) The power to allocate
receipts and disbursements as between in45
come and principal. (3) The right in a beneficiary of a trust to assent to a periodic accounting and thereby relieve the trustee from further accountability. 6
The regulations state that the term "power of appointment" does not include
powers reserved by the decedent to himself within the concept of Section 811 (c),
relating to transfers in contemplation of or taking effect at death, or Section
811(d), relating to revocable transfers. Furthermore, no provisions of this section limit the application of any other section of the Code or regulations. For
example, if A, under a trust created by another, has the right to income for life
and a power to appoint the remainder by will, and in default of such appointment
the income is payable to W for life and the remainder is payable to A's estate,
A's gross estate will include the value of his interest in remainder, whether or not
he exercises his power and whether or not the power was created before or after
October 21, 1942.7
8 The tentative regulations of August, 1953, merely stated, "A power in the decedent to remove
or discharge a trustee and appoint himself may be a power of appointment".
4 It appears to the writer that such a power in most instances would be a power to shift beneficial interests and, therefore, dangerous unless a non-general power.
5 The tentative regulations of August, 1953, did not refer to a power to allocate receipts and
disbursements between income and principal.
6 The tentative regulations referred here to "a beneficiary of an inter vivos trust". The writer
suggested in his letter to the Commissioner that 'inter vivos" be eliminated, and this suggestion
was accepted for the final regulations.
7 The writer believes the example, even in the final regulations, leaves much unsaid. It is not
indicated whether or not the power is general or non-general. Furthermore, if A exercises a pre1942 general power or merely holds a post-1942 general power, it appears to the writer that the
value of the entire trust would be included in his gross estate under Section 811(f) of the 1939
Code or Section 2041 of the 1954 Code, as a power of appointment, and in that case the value
of his remainder interest would not as such be included in his gross estate. The example in the
tentative regulations referred to "a trust" without indicating whether or not the trust had been
created by the holder of the power or another. The final regulations cleared this point by changing
"a trust" to "a trust created by S". The writcr's comment on the example in the tentative regu-
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If the power of appointment applies only to part of an entire group of assets
or only to a limited interest in property, this section applies only to such part or
interest.
Paragraph (a) (3) defines the term "general power of appointment" to mean,
except for the limitations in pargraph (b), "any power of appointment exercisable
in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate".
Thus general powers would include:
( 1 Those exercisable to meet the estate tax.
Those exercisable to meet any other taxes, debts and charges which
2
are enforceable against the estate.
If the power is 'exercisable "for the purpose of discharging a legal obligation
of the decedent or for his pecuniary benefit", it is considered a general power. The
fact that the appointee may b'e a creditor of the decedent or his estate, however,
vill not, by itself, make the power a general on-e for the purposes of this section.8
[Emphasis supplied.]
If a power to consume, invade or appropriate property for the benefit of the
decedent is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to his health, education,
9
support or maintenance, it is not to be considered a general power of appointment.
lations was as follows: "The "example" is not clear to the writer. The context indicates that the
"trust" represents an inter vivos transfer by A, but if so it would appear that the value of the
entire trust would be includible in A's gross estate and not merely "the value of his interest in
the remainder" (A having reserved to himself a power of appointment; and a life estate in case
the trust was created after March 3, 1931). If the "trust" was created by someone other than A,
it would appear that the value of the entire trust would be includible in A's gross estate and not
merely "the value of his interest in remainder" if the power is exercised or if "the power was
created . . . . after October 21, 1942". The writer suggests that the example be reworded, to illustrate more clearly what the draftsmen of the proposed regulations wish to set forth." The final
regulations make it clear that the trust in the example was created by another ("a trust created by
S"), but fail to eliminate the reference to taxability of A's remainder interest as such, if the whole
trust is taxable under the power of appointment.
8 The fact that the appointee might be a creditor did not appear to be fully covered in the tentative regulations of 1953. The writer raised this question in his letter of August 28, 1953 to the
Commissioner: "If A can exercise a power of appointment as to $100,000 only to his children, B
and/or C, and it happens that A is indebted to B for $500, does A have a general power of appointment (1) for $500? (2) for $100,000? If the debt to B is reduced to $100 when A dies and
he appoints $60,000 to B and $40,000 to C, in no way discharging the debt to B, what amount,
if any, is includible in A's gross estate? In other words, how does the Commissioner interpret
"his creditors, or the creditors of his estate"? Will the Commissioner adopt the interpretation
that a power is "general" when exercisable in favor of a decedent's creditors or creditors of the
estate in satisfaction of debts?" The final regulations added the following sentence: "However, for
the purposes of this section, a power of appointment not otherwise considered to be a general power
of appointment is not treated as a general power of appointment merely by reason of the fact that
an appointee may, in fact, be a creditor of the decedent or his estate."
9 Is there any danger that the Commissioner will try to tax to the decedent an unlimited right in
another, such as a trustee, to use the principal for the decedent? Section 2041(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, repeating Section 811(b) (3) of the 1939 Code, refers to "a power
which is exercisable in favor of the decedent ... .". Neither the Code nor the Regulations, in the
phraseology under discussion, limits such a power to one held by the decedent. However, the report of the Senate Committee on Finance states: "A power to consume principal which is limited
by an ascertainable standard relating to the holder's health, education, support or maintenance is
not considered a general power."
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The test, as to limitation by an ascertainable standard, is to be the same as that of
deductibility for charitable, etc. purposes in the case of a bequest to a trust "for
both private and charitable purposes". 10 A power exercisable for comfort, pleasure,
desire or happiness is not limited by an ascertainable standard.
Paragraph (a) (4) specifies that there should be filed, with the federal estate
tax return, duplicate copies of instruments granting a power and of instruments
by which a power is disclaimed, renounced, exercised or released. One copy of
each instrument should be certified or verified. If the decedent was a nonresident
only one copy of each instrument, certified or verified, need be filed. The copies
must be filed even though the position is taken that the power was not a general
power of appointment and the property is not returned for tax.
Paragraph (b) (1) deals with estates of decedents dying after October 21,
1942, as to general powers of appointment created on or before October 21, 1942.
The gross estate includes the value of property over which such a power is exercised by will or by a disposition that would be taxed as a transfer under Section
811(c) 11 or Section 811(d).12 The applicable rules for Section 811(c) or (d)
are those in effect at the time of the decedent's death as applicable to transfers
made when the power was exercised. Thus, if a decedent dies after September 23,
1950, an exercise of a pre-1942 general power of appointment by deed may not
be considered a transfer in contemplation of death if he survives for three years
after the exercise. Or if this decedent, in exercising a pre-1942 general power of
appointment before October 8, 1949, makes a disposition in trust taking effect
at death and retains a reversionary interest worth less than five percent the exercise of the power is not taxed as an exercise of a general power of appointment.
If, however, the disposition was made on or after October 8, 1949, and it constituted a transfer whereby possession or enjoyment could be obtained only by surviving the decedent, the property would be includible in the gross estate under
Section 811 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.13
10

The tentative regulations did not include the word "both". The writer suggested, in his August

29, 1953 letter, that the word "both" be inserted before "private and charitable purposes". The

final regulations now clearly would encompass a trust to pay income to A for life, with certain
rights to use the principal for A, and with remainder to X charity.
11 I.R.C. of 1939-Transfers in contemplation of or taking effect at death, or in which possession or enjoyment is retained until death. Similarly, §§ 2035 - 2037, I.R.C. of 1954.
12 I.R.C. of 1939-Transfers with power reserved to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. Similarly,
§ 2038, I.R.C. of 1954.
18 Section 2037(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 adds the five percent reversionary
interest qualification to the counterpart of Section 811(c)(3) of the 1939 Code. Thus, under the
1954 Code, even though possession or enjoyment can be obtained only by surviving the transferor,
the transfer is not taxable as one taking effect at death, unless the transferor has retained a reversionary interest of more than five percent in value. If the transfer was made before October 8,
1949, the reversionary interest is a taxable factor only if it arose by the express terms of the instrument of transfer. The estate tax provisions of the 1954 Code are applicable only to decedents
dying after August 16, 1954, the date of its enactment. § 7851(a) (2) (A), I.R.C. of 1954.
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The rules of Section 811(c) and (d) of the 1939 Code, in effect on the date
of death and applicable to transfers made on the date when the exercise of the
power occurred, are to be applied in determining the extent to which, as well as the
conditions under which, a disposition is considered a transfer of property.14
A power created on or before October 21, 1942, which is exercisable only in
conjunction with another person, is not considered to be a general power of appointment. Neither the Code nor the regulations imply that adversity of interest,
as to the joint holder of the power, is a factor.
A power of appointment is exercised even though the appointee would have
been the taker in default of the appointment, whether or not the interest taken
under the appointment is identical with the default interest and whether or not
the appointee renounces any right to take under the appointment.' 5
Failure to exercise or complete the release of a general power of appointment
created on or before October 21, 1942, is not considered an exercise of the power.
In other words, pre-1942 powers are non-taxable if completely released or not

exercised.16

If a relinquishment of a general power changes the beneficial interest in property, the relinquishment will be considered to be an exercise of the power. The
regulations give an example of a trust created by A in 1940, income to B for life
and B has a general power of appointment and also the right to amend the trust.
C is to take the remainder upon default of B's appointment. If B amended the
trust in 1948, by providing that upon his death the remainder was payable to
C, and further amended the trust in 1950, by deleting his power to amend the
trust, the regulations state that the 1950 relinquishment will be considered an
exercise of the power. If the 1948 amendment had only changed ministerial powers

The reference to "extent" of taxability under Section 811(c) and (d) was missing in the
original proposed regulations. The writer commented as follows: "References to Secs. 811(c)
and (d) and examples: The chief question here would seem to be whether the "disposition" by
inter vivos deed affects the entire value of the trust, or only the interest in property that is directly
affected by the inter vivos exercise. For instance, if A created a trust by will or irrevocable inter
vivos deed subsequent to March 3, 1931, but prior to October 22, 1942, giving B the income for
life and a general power of appointment by deed (and in default of exercise the trust would
terminate on B's death and be distributed to C or C's estate), would B's inter vivos exercise of the
general power by appointment to D on B's death, require the inclusion in B's gross estate of the
entire value of the trust? Would this same trust be entirely excludible from B's gross estate if it
had been created by A prior to March 3, 1931 ?" The following sentence was subsequently added
in the final regulations: "Such rules are to be applied in determining the extent to which and the
conditions under which a disposition is considered a transfer of property."
15 For decedents dying prior to October 22, 1942, the law, as settled by various court decisions,
was different. If the appointee renounced under the power and took in default, it was held that
the property was not includible in the gross estate of the appointor. See Helvering v. Grinnell, 294
U.S. 153 (1934); Rogers v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410 (1943); and similar decisions. The 1942
Revenue Act and the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 closed this "loop-hole" for estates of decedents dying after October 21, 1942.
16 This is undoubtedly the most important distinction under current law between pre-1942 and
post-1942 general powers.
14
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of the trustee, the 1950 amendment would be considered a release and not an
17
exercise of the power.
If a general power was reduced to a non-general power through partial release accomplished prior to November 1, 1951, a subsequent exercise of the reduced power is not considered an exercise of a general power. If the decedent was
under a legal disability to release the power on October 21, 1942, he had a grace
period of six months after termination of the legal disability to reduce the power.
If the general power is partially released after the dates referred to above,
and thereafter the reduced power is exercised, the 'exercise is deemed to be an exercise of a general power.
Legal disability is determined under local law and may include the disability
of an insane person, a minor or an unborn child, but it does not include disability
due to the fact that the type of general power is not generally releasable under local
law.
General powers of appointment are considered to be releasable unless there
is local law to the contrary. The method employed to release the power will be
accepted unless it does not conform to local law on releases or similar transactions." 8
If a testator died before July 1, 1949, leaving a will executed on or before
October 21, 1942, which had not been republished by codicil or otherwise after
October 21, 1942, a power to appoint created thereby will be considered a power
created on or before October 21, 1942.19
Paragraph (b) (2) deals with general powers of appointment created after
October 21, 1942. The value of property subject to such powers held by the deced'ent at the time of his death is includible in his gross estate, whether or not the
power is exercised. The power is considered to exist at the time of death if the time
for its exercise is determined by the date of death. It is also considered to exist at
17 The first example, of two substantive amendments, illustrates a situation not frequently encountered, but it serves to point up the fact that an exercise of a pre-1942 general power is taxable by whatever means it is effected and even though the appointee is the same as the taker in default. The tentative regulations of August, 1953, had only a short sentence on the combination of
exercise and relinquishment, as follows: "An exercise which concurrently carries with it a complete
relinquishment of the power of appointment or an exercise followed by a complete relinquishment
of the power of appointment is deemed an exercise and not a release of the power of appointment.."
18 The Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947 has a specific and helpful section on "Release or disclaimer of powers or interests", 20 P.S. 301.3.
19 In his comments on the proposed regulations of August 5, 1953, the writer suggested that
it would be helpful to have an indication in the regulations as to the Commissioner's position in
regard to the date of creation of a power of appointment created by a revocable deed of trust. "For
instance, A creates a revocable deed in 1941, income to himself for life, then income to B for life,
and B has a general power of appointment. A dies in 1943 and the trust thereupon becomes irrevocable by death. Is B's general power of appointment a power created on or before October
21, 1942?" The question is not answered specifically in the final regulations, but Revenue Ruling
278 issued in December, 1953 (1953-2 C.B. 267) does not leave much room for doubt. Its headnote is as follows: "Where an insured retains until his death the right to change the beneficiary
and the right to surrender the policies or obtain loans thereon, a power of appointment given in
the policies to the beneficiary with respect to the proceeds of such policies is "created" at the time
of the death of the insured within the meaning of section 811(f) of the Internal Revenue Code."
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death even though the exercise is subject to the precedent giving of notice or even
though the exercise takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period after its
exercise, whether or not notice has been given or the power has been exercised
prior to death.
Except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth, tht exercise or release of a general power created after October 21, 1942, will require the property subject thereto to be included in
the gross estate, provided that the disposition would be taxed as a transfer under
Section 811 (c) or Section 811 (d) if it had been a transfer of property owned by
the decedent. The principles applicable to Sections 811 (c) and (d) are noted in
the comments on paragraph (b) (1), supra.
Joint powers created after October 21, 1942, exercisable only in conjunction
with another person, are not taxed as general powers of appointment if the decedent
could 'exercise the power only with the consent or joinder of the creator of the
power or if the decedent could exercise the power only with the consent or joinder
of a person having an interest substantially adverse. A taker in default of appointment would have an adverse interest. A coholder of a power would have an
adverse interest if he would become a sole holder of a general power after the
dcath of his coholder.
If a joint general power is not within the exceptions mentioned above, then
each coholder is considered as having a taxable general power over an aliquot
share of the property subject to the power. Thus, if X, Y and Z hold an unlimited
power jointly, but on the death of X the power does not pass to Y and Z jointly,
then X would be taxed as having a general power over one-third of the property.
Subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (b) (2) deals with releases and lapses of
general powers of appointment. The regulations state that a release need not be
formal or express in character. If a general power created after October 21, 1942,
lapses through failure of the holder to exercise it within a specified time, the lapse
constitutes a release, and the property subject to the general power is includible
in the gross estate when the former holder of the power dies, provided that the
release, if it were applicable to property owned by the decedent, could be taxed
as a transfer under Section 811 (c) or Section 811 (d) 20° The foregoing rule as to
a lapse is subject to an exception or exclusion as to the first $5,000 or five percent
of the value, whichever is greater. If an individual has a noncumulative right to
withdraw principal each calendar year from a trust fund and he allows the right
to lapse for 1953 and 1954 and dies in 1955, nothing will be includible in his
gross estate as a lapse or release for 1953 and 1954, except as to any excess of the
amounts lapsed 2l each of those years over $5,000 or five percent of the trust fund,
whichever is greater. The right to the amount he could have withdrawn in 1955,
could apply if rights to withdraw are relatively large in proportion to the fund or
20
21

See notes 11 and 12, supra.
Valued as hereinafter set forth.
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prior to death, did not "lapse" prior to his death, and such an amount is includible
in his gross estate as property subject to a general power of appointment,2 2 less
any amount he did withdraw prior to death. Thus the lapse of any right to withdraw up to $5,000 is not taxed. If the lapse exceeds $5,000, whether the right to
withdraw is measured in terms of dollars or in percentage of principal, taxability
depends on the value of the fund at the time of the lapse. If the individual has a
right to withdraw $15,000 and the fund is valued at $200,000 at the time of the
lapse, five percent of the $200,000 or $10,000 is exempt.
If the lapse exceeds $5,000 or five percent of the fund, whichever is greater,
the amount includible in the gross estate when the individual dies depends upon
two factors, the value of the fund at the time of lapse and the value of the fund at
date of death. The regulations state that the valuation is to be ascertained in accordance with the principles applicable to transfers under Section 811 (c) and
(d).23 The Senate Finance Committee Report on the bill gives the follow ing
examples:
FIRST EXAMPLE

(a) Lapse of right to withdraw $50,000 of trust principal.
(b) When principal of the trust is worth $1,000,000.
(c) The value of the lapse does not exceed five percent of the then value
and no part is treated as a taxable disposition.
SECOND EXAMPLE

(a) Lapse of right to withdraw $50,000 of trust principal.
(b) When principal of the trust is worth $800,000.
(c) Only five percent or $40,000 exempt, and $10,000 is a "disposition".
(d) If value of the trust is $600,000 when the holder of the former
right dies, $7,500 is includible in his gross estate.
$600,000
$800,000 x $10,000
$7,500
(e) If value of the trust is $1,200,000 when the holder of the former
right dies, $15,000 is includible in his gross estate.
$1,200,000
$800,000 X $10,000
$15,000
The taxable lapse for each year is to be computed separately. Although the
value of the fund for the date of death is constant in the case of any individual
holder of a right to withdraw, the value of the fund at the time of each lapse, the
denominator of the fraction as above, would vary from year to year.
If optional valuations for the estate are elected by the personal representative,
the valuation of the fund under Section 811 (j) of the Code2 4 is to be used instead
of date of death values for the numerator of the fraction referred to above.
22

28
24

A power to appoint to himself.
I.R.C. of 1939. The comparable provisions of the 1954 Code are Sections 2035-2037.
§ 2032 of the 1954 Code.
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The total amounts taxed as excess lapses cannot exceed the value of the fund
at the date of death or under optional valuations as the case may be. This limitation
if lapses occur for many years. Thus if the life tenant of a $100,000 trust that does
not change in value has a noncumulative right to withdraw $20,000 annually, and
permits the right to lapse for ten years and then dies in the eleventh year, the
amount includible in the gross estate of the life tenant would first be computed
as follows:
Excess over five percent each year X 10
Unexercised right, eleventh year

$15,000.00
20,000.00
$170,000.00

The fund is still worth only $100,000 at the date of death of the life tenant,
the
foregoing limitation would reduce the amount includible in the gross estate
and
of the deceased life tenant from $170,000 to $100,000.
The question could arise as to whether the five percent or $5,000 limitation
can be avoided by the use of multiple trusts. The regulations in subparagraph (iii)
use the word "power" repeatedly in the singular, but in one instance refer to
"lapsed powers". The use of the plural form, however, could here be construed as
referring to a lapse of the same power in two or more years. The Senate Finance
Committee Report on the bill is not helpful in this matter. However, the 1951
Act itself, and now the Internal Revenue Cade of 1954, are consistent in using
"powers" in the plural in all three references to the five percent or $5,000 exception to taxability. For instance, the exceptions apply "with respect to the lapse
of powers during any calendar year". It is the writer's belief that the Commissioner
will consider that the law limits the five percent or $5,000 exclusion to an annual
exclusion for each taxpayer-decedent and will not apply the exclusion to each
power of appointment the decedent may have under various trusts or instruments.
The last part of paragraph 81.24(b) (2) of the regulations deals with "disclaimers or renunciations". These are not considered to be "releases" of a power
and are removed from the taxable class. To qualify as a non-taxable act as contrasted with a taxable release, however, the disclaimer or renunciation must satisfy
certain conditions:
(1) It must be unequivocal, "a complete and unqualified refusal to accept the rights to which one is entitled".
(2) It must be effective under local law.
(3) It must preced'e any "acceptance" of the power. "In the absence of
facts to the contrary, the failure to renounce or disclaim within a
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reasonable time after learning of its existence
will be presumed to
25
constitute an acceptance of the power."
Subparagraph 81.24(b) (2) (iv) deals with successive powers of appointment,
whether or not the original power or successive power is "general". If B is the
donee of a power, general or non-general, created after October 21, 1942, and
exercises it26 by creating another power, general or non-general, in C, and if C

could exercise the power "so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or interest
in such property, or so as to suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such property, for a period ascertainablewithout regard to the date of the
creation of the trust power', then B's exercise of his power of appointment, whether
the power be general or non-general, is a disposition that results in the inclusion
in B's estate of that much of the property subject to the power as he appoints subject to the successive power. [Emphasis supplied.]

This subsection would appear to have a very limited application, possibly only
in Delaware and Wisconsin, where the use of successive powers might extend the
period permitted by the rule against perpetuities or the rule against restraints on

alienation.
The final paragraph of the regulations, Section 81.24(c), applies only to decedents who died on or before October 21, 1942. It repeats Section 81.24 of Regulation 105 issued for chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 before the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942, and it is now of only historical interest.
25 In his comments on the proposed regulations of August 5, 1953, the writer suggested that it
would be very helpful to have examples and more material on disclaimers and renunciations,
especially as to "reasonable time" and what constitutes "learning of its existence". However, the
final regulations made no change in the original proposed regulations. Failure to furnish better
guides would seem to encourage unnecessary litigation and to delay settlement of tax liability.
If A bequeaths his estate in trust to pay income to his brother, B, and provides B with a general
power of appointment by will, with the principal to go to B's children in default of exercise of the
power, does B have a few days or a few weeks or a few months after A's death or after the probate
of the will or after receiving a copy of it within which to disclaim or renounce his power? Would
the time be shorter if A had told B of the contents of his will or had lodged it or an analysis
of it with him? In any event, it appears that time is of the essence in effectuating a tax-free disclaimer or renunciation.
26 By will, or by a disposition that would be taxed as a transfer in contemplation of death or as a
transfer with possession or enjoyment retained if the property had been B's to begin with.

